Copyright © José Cossa
Introduction and Rationale
The issue of representation in
any field can be attributed in part to how we understand the fallibility of
such a field given certain conditions and, for the most part, to whether a
field will survive certain forces at work that are endogenous or exogenous to
it. On a conceptual level, I am not aware of any study claiming to fit a CIE
framework that has tackled the question of what conditions are deemed necessary
(N) and sufficient (S) for the field to be considered representative of and
through its three main elements—i.e., comparative, international, and
education—nor am I aware of a study that addresses the properties (P) and
dimensions (D) that would help conceptualize such representation and
representativeness. Pitkin’s conceptual analysis (Pitkin, 1967) emphasizes context, albeit limited to
the confines of Western modernity and theorizing, as a key ingredient when
trying to understand representation and results in a four-fold classification
of representation as formalistic representation, descriptive representation,
symbolic representation, and substantive representation. The bi-dimensional
formalistic representation, which encompasses authorization and accountability,
is characterized by the institutional arrangements that precede, initiate,
follow, and terminate such representation; descriptive representation is
characterized by “the making of something absent by resemblance or reflection,
as in a mirror or in art” (p. 11); symbolic representation is characterized by the
meaning that a representative has for those being represented; and, substantive
representation is characterized by the “activity of representatives—that is,
the actions taken on behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of, and as a
substitute for the represented” (Dovi, 2017) .
Pitkins has categorically claimed
representation as a modern concept, therefore a concept of modernity dated from
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This, we must understand, bears (even
if unconsciously or unintendedly) a constraint and commitment to a coloniality
embedded in modernity as evidenced in the historicity of representation as a
concept that was shaped by Western civilizations and their major turning points
(e.g., the American and French Revolutions in which the concept became
associated with the ‘rights of men’). Despite this concealment of coloniality
in Pitkin’s conceptualization of representation, the etymological argument of
representation as re-presentation or making (something) present again can be
of great use to today’s scholars concerned with the issue, if representation is
to be understood as re-presenting or making (the non-present a.k.a. the marginalized)
present again. This, nonetheless, maintains coloniality by maintaining the other as a neglected entity that
must be brought to the spotlight as those
who are present or those needing to be
showcased by the ones holding the spotlight that showcases the humanized.
In holding coloniality as a factor in understanding and critiquing
representation in light of Pitkin’s already critical, yet limited, conceptualization
of representation, one is inevitably bound on a journey that questions our
current engagements with advocacy that holds representation as a universal
concept and shies away from critiquing the roots of coloniality that have
hindered our very understanding of what it means to be human.
Any entity or field interested in
addressing issues of diversity and inclusion with earnestness must do so by
considering the coloniality inherent in the concept of representation and the power
dynamics inherent in negotiations about a wide variety of spaces, since both
diversity and inclusion deal with spatial width and spatial depth, respectively,
and presuppose special negotiations. Hence, just as representation must ask
questions about its own role within coloniality, diversity and inclusion must
ask questions of hermeneutical power, a conceptual brainchild of modernity, which
is in the heart of the license to create, legitimize, interpret, and apply. Hermeneutical
power, in the inequitable sphere that calls for diversity and inclusion, is the
attribution of power imbalances to a lack of understanding of both the nature
of the implications and the essence of the agreements or documents embodying
such agreements (Cossa 2008). Remember that diversity and inclusion are special
negotiations, thus agreements are a critical aspect of such negotiations
rendering hermeneutical power a force to be reckoned with. Given its anchor on understanding and
interpretation of text, hermeneutical power places the groups proposing the
agreements at an advantageous position, thus relegating those others to a position of disadvantage. Arguably, it is insightful to note that those
who propose the agreements, and conceive the documents establishing such
agreements, know better the historicity and the language of the documents as
well as the essence and the implications of the agreements therein. That is, they
know what they seek through these agreements because they “know” the spirit of the document and they perceive
the intrinsic and extrinsic meaning and implications of the given agreement.
We should be cognizant of the
fact that the “knowledge” of the spirit
of an agreement penetrates deeper than the text per se to the sources evoked in the text, i.e., classical authors
with theoretical, epistemological, ontological, and axiological kinship to
those who propose the agreements. Such kinship or proximity of a particular
party and distance of the other, to
the classical sources of knowledge inspiring the agreements is essential to the
concern with hermeneutical. Thus, degrees of closeness (that is, proximity and
distance) to the author’s thought process constitute the measure of mastery of
textual content and, in turn, mastery of textual content signifies an ability
to manipulate content by unearthing the subtleties concealing essential
meanings. This framework is relevant to discussions and spatial negotiations about
diversity and inclusion, given the coloniality of hermeneutical power and the
coloniality of representation as a hidden face of modernity.
Inherent in the nuances of
hermeneutical power is also the fact that closeness and distance leads to
mediation between the core, i.e., the institutions or parties who originate the
agreements, and the periphery entities, i.e., institutions or constituencies in
the represented/receiving end of the
agreements. Since mediators are not from
neutral entities, rather personnel with links to core entities (e.g., epistemological
and axiological links), mediation results in the preservation of hermeneutical
power in that it does nothing to change the spirit of the negotiations, but
ultimately enhances the center’s understanding of the periphery. Thus, mediation becomes a tool to preserve
hermeneutical power. As scholars educated in traditions that carry the hidden
coloniality of modernity, we often serve as mediators between the core and the
periphery; yet, our obscure link to modernity constrains us from engaging in
de-coloniality that engenders border-thinking and border-operating.
What then can we say about our field?
These cogitations on the coloniality
of representation and hermeneutical power have serious implications on Comparative
and International Education scholars’ (un)engagement with epistemological and
axiological diversity and inclusion. CIE was founded under classical modernist
and classical cosmopolitan perceptions of how the world ought to be ordered (or
modernity) and how to nurture planetary conviviality (or cosmolitanism). This
order and conviviality informed the way the field was shaped by its founding
editors and scholars who surrounded them and continues to shape our engagement
with one another as scholars who navigate the complexity of today’s world.
While we may fail to see the intricate influence of cosmopolitanism through the
lenses of Francisco de Vitoria’s Christianizing design, we may readily see
Emmanuel Kant’s secularizing design. Nonetheless, I challenge us to see both
designs as inseparable in informing the assumed limits of our present-day
conceptualizations of diversity and inclusion in scholarship. Mignolo urges us
to look at this intertwining of the religious and the secular designs through
the lenses of coloniality as a hidden face of modernity and its condition of
possibility (Mignolo, 2000) . If diversity and inclusion continue to
be addressed within perspectives engendered by narratives of modernity and
cosmopolitanism, even if at a critical modernist level, they will rule out the
problem of coloniality and fall short of being critically critical. This
limitation is also informed by the very classical modernist fallacy that change
can only come from within, which is a clear elimination of possibility from
without and an exaltation of classical modernity and classical cosmopolitanism
as the legitimate sets of designs and projects embodying the formula for human
civilization. Following this enslaving and patronizing narrative, it seems like
no group operating in spheres external to Western epistemology and axiology can
bring about diversity and inclusion, since valid epistemology and axiology
informing diversity and inclusion are conceptual properties of modernity and
cosmopolitanism. In order to deal with this enslaving and patronizing
narrative, Mignolo argues for exteriority as a means to counter the inside yet
remain necessary to its eventual transformation. This is an argument I have
held for decades in regards to transformation of systems, be it overtly or
covertly oppressive. Both exteriority
(in Mignolo’s language) and remaining
outside (in my language) call for continuing engagement in what happens
inside without making the inside the source of the exterior’s existence; in
other words, the exterior should be able to know itself outside of the
engagement with the interior.
Ultimately, it is noteworthy that changes occurring
within the hidden coloniality of modernity do not carry the much needed
transformative force, sustainability, and global reach. We must be reminded that
when the shift from Orbis Christianus
to Orbis Universalis occurred in the
Sixteenth Century, it seemed to offer a promise to humanity. However, one
should not be fooled by the coloniality inherent in the emancipatory simulation
of such a shift. Shifting centers from Christians
vs Gentiles (as in Vitoria’s
conceptualization of the others as
Gentes) to Citizens vs Foreigner (as in Kantian
conceptualization of the Western European as citizen) did very little to change
the condition of the others.
Fast-forward five centuries and we are still imprisoned by both religious and
secular classifications of citizens versus
aliens. What will distinguish us from
previous generations, as we wrestle with representation and (in)equality, is
how far are we willing to challenge our own coloniality hidden in modernity, as
a set of designs to manage the world, and in cosmopolitanism, as a set of
projects dictating planetary conviviality.
[1] Pitkin,
H. F. (1967). The concept of representation. Univ of California
Press.
[2] Cossa,
J. (2008). Power, Politics, and Higher Education in Southern Africa:
International Regimes, Local Governments, and Educational Autonomy. Amherst,
NY: Cambria Press.
[3] Necessary,
Sufficient, Properties, and Dimensions. For a philosophical treatment of these
elements, see Norman Swartz (1997). The Concepts of Necessary Conditions and Sufficient Conditions.
Available: http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/conditions1.htm
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